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Abstract 
The growing problem of unsolicited bulk e-mail, also known 
as “spam”, has generated a need for reliable anti-spam e-mail 
filters. Filters of this type have so far been based mostly on 
manually constructed keyword patterns. An alternative 
approach has recently been proposed, whereby a Naive 
Bayesian classifier is trained automatically to detect spam 
messages. We test this approach on a large collection of 
personal e-mail messages, which we make publicly available 
in “encrypted” form contributing towards standard 
benchmarks. We introduce appropriate cost-sensitive 
measures, investigating at the same time the effect of attribute-
set size, training-corpus size, lemmatization, and stop lists, 
issues that have not been explored in previous experiments. 
Finally, the Naive Bayesian filter is compared, in terms of 
performance, to a filter that uses keyword patterns, and which 
is part of a widely used e-mail reader.  
Keywords 
filtering/routing; text categorization; machine learning and IR; 
evaluation (general); test collections 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the increasing popularity and low cost of e-
mail have attracted the attention of direct marketers. Using 
readily available bulk-mailing software and large  lists of e-
mail addresses, typically harvested from web pages and 
newsgroup archives, it is now possible to send blindly 
unsolicited messages to thousands of recipients at essentially 
no cost. As a result, it is becoming increasingly common for 
users to receive daily large quantities of unsolicited bulk e-
mail, known as spam, advertising anything from vacations to 
get-rich schemes. The term Unsolicited Commercial E-mail 
(UCE) is also used in the literature. We use “spam” with a 
broader meaning, that does not exclude unsolicited bulk e-mail 
sent for non-commercial purposes (e.g. to communicate a 
message from a sectarian group).  
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Spam messages are annoying to most users, as they waste their 
time and clutter their mailboxes. They also cost money to users 
with dial-up connections, waste bandwidth, and may expose 
minors to unsuitable content (e.g. when advertising 
pornographic sites). A 1997 study [3] found that spam 
messages constituted approximately 10% of the incoming 
messages to a corporate network. The situation seems to be 
worsening, and without appropriate counter-measures, spam 
messages could eventually undermine the usability of e-mail. 
Anti-spam legal measures are gradually being adopted, but 
they have had a very limited effect so far.1 Of more direct 
value are anti-spam filters, software tools that attempt to block 
automatically spam messages.2 Apart from blacklists of 
frequent spammers and lists of trusted users, which can be 
incorporated into any anti-spam strategy, these filters have so 
far relied mostly on manually constructed keyword patterns 
(e.g. blocking messages whose bodies contain “be over 21”). 
To be most effective and to avoid the risk of accidentally 
deleting non-spam messages, hereafter called legitimate 
messages, these patterns need to be manually tuned to the 
incoming e-mail of each user. Fine-tuning the patterns, 
however, requires time and expertise that are not always 
available. Even worse, the characteristics of spam messages 
(e.g. topics, frequent terms) change over time, requiring the 
keyword patterns to be updated periodically [3]. It is, therefore, 
desirable to develop anti-spam filters that will learn 
automatically how to block spam messages by processing 
previously received spam and legitimate messages.  
Sahami et al. [23] recently proposed using a machine learning 
algorithm to construct a filter of this type. They trained a Naive 
Bayesian classifier [7] [20] on manually categorized legitimate 
and spam messages, reporting impressive performance on 
unseen messages. Although machine learning algorithms have 
been applied to several text categorization tasks (e.g. [1], [5], 
[17], [18], [19]), including applications where the goal is to 
thread e-mail [18], to classify e-mail into folders [2] [21], or to 
identify interesting news articles  ([14]; see also [11]), to the 
best of our knowledge Sahami et al.’s experiments constitute 
the only previous attempt to apply machine learning to anti-
spam filtering.  
It may come as a surprise that text categorization techniques 
can be effective in anti-spam filtering. Unlike most text 
categorization tasks, it is the act of blindly mass-mailing an 
unsolicited message that makes it spam, not its actual content: 
                                                 
1 Consult http://www.cauce.org , http://spam.abuse.net , and 
http://www.junkemail.org . 
2 See, for example, http://www.tucows.com .  
 any otherwise legitimate message becomes spam if blindly 
mass-mailed. Nevertheless, it seems that the language of 
current spam messages constitutes a distinctive genre, and that 
the topics of most current spam messages are rarely mentioned 
in legitimate messages, making it possible to train successfully 
a text classifier for anti-spam filtering.  
Past experience in text categorization has proven the beneficial 
role of publicly available manually categorized document 
collections, like the Reuters corpus [16], that can be used as 
benchmarks to compare alternative techniques. For the 
purposes of anti-spam filtering, such benchmark collections 
would ideally consist of manually categorized legitimate and 
spam messages as received by real users. Making a collection 
of this sort, however, publicly available in raw form would 
violate the privacy of the recipients and senders of legitimate 
messages. We show, however, that it is possible to “encrypt” 
the collection’s messages in a way that respects privacy issues, 
while still leading to useful public collections.3  
We test Sahami et al.’s approach on an encrypted collection of 
legitimate and spam messages, dubbed PU1 corpus, which we 
make publicly available contributing towards standard 
benchmarks.4 Unlike previous experiments, we employ ten-
fold cross-validation, which makes our results less prone to 
random variation. Our investigation also examines the effect of 
attribute-set size, training-corpus size, lemmatization, and 
stop-lists, issues that were not explored in Sahami et al.’s 
experiments. Legitimate messages that can be easily identified 
using lists of trusted users have not been included in PU1, 
leading to a “tougher” corpus than the one used by Sahami et 
al.; nevertheless, our results confirm Sahami et al.’s high 
precision and recall figures. We argue, however, that anti-spam 
filters must be evaluated using measures that incorporate a 
decision-theoretic notion of cost; and a cost-sensitive 
evaluation reveals that additional safety nets are necessary for 
anti-spam filtering to be viable in practice. Further evaluation 
shows that the Naive Bayesian filter is by far superior to a 
keyword-based anti-spam filter that is included in a widely 
used e-mail reader.  
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 
introduces the Naive Bayesian Classifier and Sahami et al.’s 
results; section 3 discusses how the PU1 corpus was 
assembled, and presents the results we obtained with the Naive 
Bayesian classifier and the keyword-based filter; section 4 
introduces cost-sensitive evaluation measures; and section 5 
concludes. 
2. The Naive Bayesian classifier  
The Naive Bayesian classifier [7] [20] assumes that each 
document (in our case, each message) is represented by a 
vector nxxxxx ,,,, 321 l= , where nxx ,,1 l  are the values of 
attributes nXX ,,1 l , much as in the vector space model [24]. 
                                                 
3 Another approach is to use a collection consisting of spam 
messages, and legitimate messages extracted from publicly 
available archives of e-mail lists. We explored this direction in 
previous work to be reported elsewhere.  
4 PU1 is available from the publications section of 
http://www.iit.demokritos.gr/~ionandr . 
Following Sahami et al., we use binary attributes, i.e. 1=iX  if 
the message has the property represented by iX , and 0=iX  
otherwise. Our experiments were conducted using only word-
attributes, i.e. each attribute shows whether or not a particular 
word (eg. “adult”) is present in the message. It is possible, 
however, to use additional attributes corresponding to phrases 
(e.g. “be over 21”) or non-textual properties (e.g. whether or 
not the message contains attachments); we return to this point 
below.  
Following Sahami et al., we use mutual information ( MI ) to 
select among all possible attributes (in our case, all possible 
word-attributes). We compute the mutual information 
);( CXMI  of each candidate attribute X  with the category-
denoting variable C  as:  
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We then select the attributes with the highest mutual 
information values. The probabilities ),( CXP , )(XP , and 
)(CP  are estimated from a training corpus as frequency 
ratios.5  
From Bayes’ theorem and the theorem of total probability, it 
follows that the probability that a document with vector 
nxxx ,,1 l=  belongs to category c  is: 
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In practice, the probabilities )|( CXP  are impossible to 
estimate without simplifying assumptions, because the possible 
values of X  are too many and there are also data sparseness 
problems. The Naive Bayesian classifier assumes that 
nXX ,,1 l  are conditionally independent given the category 
C , which allows us to compute )|( xXcCP
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)|( CXP i  and )(CP  are easy to estimate from the frequencies 
of the training corpus. A large number of empirical studies 
have found the Naive Bayesian classifier to be surprisingly 
effective [6] [15], despite the fact that the assumption that 
nXX ,,1 l  are conditionally independent is usually (including 
our word-attributes case) overly simplistic.6  
                                                 
5 Consult [20] for more elaborate estimates that we hope to 
investigate in future work. 
6 Consult [10] for forms of Bayesian classifiers with less 
restrictive independence assumptions.  
 In anti-spam filtering, mistakenly blocking a legitimate 
message (classifying a legitimate message as spam) is 
generally more severe an error than letting a spam message 
pass the filter (classifying a spam message as legitimate). We 
use SL→  (legitimate to spam) and LS →  (spam to 
legitimate) to denote the two error types, respectively, and 
invoking a decision-theoretic notion of cost, we assume that 
SL→  is λ  times more costly than LS → . We classify a 
message as spam if the following classification criterion is 
met: 
λ>
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To the extent that the independence assumption holds and the 
probability estimates are accurate, a classifier based on this 
criterion achieves optimal results [7]. In our case, 
)|(1)|( xXlegitimateCPxXspamCP ==−=== , and the 
criterion above is equivalent to: 
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In the experiments of Sahami et al., the threshold t  was set to 
0.999, which corresponds to 999=λ . This means that 
mistakenly blocking a legitimate message was taken to be as 
bad as letting 999 spam messages pass the filter. When 
blocked messages are discarded without further processing, 
setting λ  to such a high value is reasonable, because in that 
case most users would consider losing a legitimate message 
unacceptable. Configurations with additional safety nets are 
possible, however, and lower λ  values would be reasonable in 
those cases.  
For example, rather than being deleted, a blocked message 
could be returned to the sender, along with an automatically 
inserted apology paragraph. The extra paragraph would explain 
that the message was blocked by an anti-spam filter, and it 
would ask the sender to forward the message to a different, 
private un-filtered e-mail address of the recipient (see also 
[12]). The private address would never be advertised (e.g. on 
web pages or newsgroups), making it unlikely to receive spam 
mail directly. The apology paragraph could also include a 
frequently changing riddle (e.g. “Include in the subject the 
capital of France.”) to ensure that spam messages are not 
forwarded automatically to the private address by robots that 
scan returned messages for new e-mail addresses. Messages 
sent to the private address without the correct riddle answer 
would be deleted automatically. (Spammers cannot afford the 
time to answer by hand thousands of riddles.)  
In the scenario of the previous paragraph, 9=λ  ( 9.0=t ) 
seems more reasonable: blocking a legitimate message is 
penalized mildly more than letting a spam message pass, to 
account for the fact that recovering from a blocked legitimate 
message requires overall more work (counting the sender’s 
extra work to repost it) than recovering from a spam message 
that passed the filter (deleting it manually). If the recipient 
does not care about the extra work imposed on the sender, then 
even 1=λ  ( 5.0=t ) can be acceptable.  
Table 1 shows the results that Sahami et al. reported, using 
999=λ  ( 999.0=t ). (We omit an experiment on detecting 
spam subcategories, which did not show promising results.) 
Assuming that SLn →  and LSn →  are the numbers of SL→  
and LS→  errors, and that LLn →  and SSn →  count the 
correctly treated legitimate and spam messages respectively, 
spam recall ( SR ) and spam precision ( SP ) are defined as 
follows: 
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The first three experiments of table 1 were performed with a 
collection of 1789 messages, consisting of 211 legitimate 
messages that users had saved and 1578 spam messages. In the 
first experiment only word-attributes were used. In the second 
experiment, phrasal candidate attributes were added (e.g. 
corresponding to the phrases “be over 21”, “only $”). In the 
third experiment, additional non-textual candidate attributes 
were inserted (e.g. whether or not the message contains 
attachments, or a high proportion of non alphanumeric 
characters). The phrasal and non-textual candidate attributes 
were constructed by hand. All candidate attributes (word, 
phrasal, non-textual) were subjected to a single MI -based 
selection. The fourth experiment was similar to the third one, 
but it was performed with a different collection, containing all 
the messages a user had received over an entire year. The 500 
attributes with the highest MI  were used in all cases, but no 
rigorous testing was conducted to select this number of 
attributes.  
While phrasal and non-textual attributes were found to 
improve results, they introduce a manual configuration phase, 
since one has to select manually phrases and non-textual 
properties to be treated as candidate attributes. Our target was 
to explore fully automatic anti-spam filtering, and hence we 
limited ourselves to word-attributes. We hope to incorporate in 
Attributes Total 
Messages 
Testing 
Messages 
Spam 
Messages (%) 
Spam 
Precision (%) 
Spam 
Recall (%) 
words only 1789 251 88.2 97.1 94.3 
words + phrases 1789 251 88.2 97.6 94.3 
words + phrases + non-textual 1789 251 88.2 100.0 98.3 
words + phrases + non-textual 2815 222 ~20 92.3 80.0 
Table 1: Results of Sahami et al. (500 attributes, 999.0=t , 999=λ ) 
 future work automatic techniques, similar to those used in term 
extraction [9], to locate candidate phrasal attributes 
automatically.  
3. Experiments with the PU1 corpus 
We now turn to the corpus that we used, PU1, and our 
experiments. The PU1 corpus consists of 1099 messages: 
481 spam messages. These are all the spam messages that the 
first author received over a period of 22 months, excluding 
non-English messages (so far, these are very rare). Duplicates 
of spam messages sent on the same day were also not included 
(these are common, but they are very easy to detect with 
conventional technology).  
618 legitimate messages. These were derived as follows. First, 
all the English legitimate messages that the first author had 
received and saved (excluding self-addressed messages) over a 
period of 36 months were collected (1182 messages). Many of 
the collected messages were from people with which the first 
author has (or had) regular correspondence, mostly colleagues 
and friends, that are unlikely to send spam messages. To 
ensure that the anti-spam filter never misclassifies messages 
from those senders, the filter’s users can be instructed to insert 
into their address books people they find they correspond 
regularly with (this is very easy in modern e-mail readers). 
Messages received from senders in a user’s address book can 
then be classified blindly as legitimate, without applying the 
anti-spam filter on them. To emulate this mechanism, we 
deleted from the 1182 messages all but the earliest five 
messages of each sender (leaving 618). We assume that by the 
time the sixth legitimate message of a particular sender arrives, 
the sender will have been inserted into the address book, and 
the anti-spam filter will not have to examine messages from 
this sender any more.  
For our experiments, we implemented the Naive Bayesian 
classifier on the GATE platform [4]. Our implementation 
includes an English lemmatizer that converts each word to its 
base form (e.g. “earned” becomes “earn”), and a stop-list 
module that removes from each message the 100 most frequent 
words of the British National Corpus (BNC).7 These two 
modules can be enabled or disabled to measure their effect.  
Attachments and HTML tags were removed from all messages. 
To respect privacy issues, in the publicly available version of 
PU1, fields other than “Subject:” were removed, and each 
token (word, number, punctuation symbol, etc.) in the bodies 
or subjects of the messages was replaced by a unique number, 
the same number throughout all the messages. For example: 
From: spammer@spamcompany.com 
To: spamtarget@provider.com 
Subject: Get rich now ! 
 
Click here to get rich ! Try it now ! 
                                                 
7 GATE, including the lemmatizer we used, is available from 
http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/research/groups/nlp/gate. BNC 
frequencies are available from ftp://ftp.itri.bton.ac.uk/pub/bnc. 
We also experimented with stop-lists containing frequent 
words of particular parts of speech (e.g. verbs only), but results 
showed no significant difference.   
becomes: 
Subject: 1 2 3 4  
 
5 6 7 1 2 4 8 9 3 4  
 
There are actually four “encrypted” versions of the publicly 
available PU1 corpus, one for each combination of 
enabled/disabled stop-list and lemmatizer. The correspondence 
between tokens and numbers is not released, making it very 
difficult to figure out what the messages say.8 This encryption 
scheme places some limitations on the resources that can be 
exploited when experimenting with PU1. For example, 
thesauri or part-of-speech taggers cannot be used, since the 
exact words of the messages are unknown. PU1, however, can 
still be used to experiment with any classification technique 
that relies only on frequency and co-occurrence statistics (the 
Naive Bayesian classifier and most of the machine learning 
techniques cited in section 1 fall into this category). 
In all our experiments with the Naive Bayesian classifier, we 
used ten-fold cross validation to reduce random variation. That 
is, PU1 was partitioned randomly into ten parts, and each 
experiment was repeated ten times, each time reserving a 
different part for testing, and using the remaining nine parts for 
training. Results were then averaged over the ten runs. In our 
first series of experiments, we varied the number of retained 
attributes (attributes with highest MI ) from 50 to 700 by a 
step of 50, for all four combinations of enabled/disabled 
lemmatizer and stop-list, and for three thresholds: 999.0=t  
( 999=λ ), 9.0=t  ( 9=λ ), and 5.0=t ( 1=λ ). As discussed 
in section 2, these thresholds are taken to represent three usage 
scenarios of the anti-spam filter: deleting blocked messages 
immediately; asking the sender to re-post them to a private 
address and accounting for the sender’s extra work; and asking 
the sender to re-post them to a private address ignoring the 
sender’s extra work. Figures 1 – 3 show the spam recall and 
spam precision that the Naive Bayesian classifier achieved. 
There are different points for different numbers of retained 
attributes.  
We also implemented a simpler filter that uses the 
(presumably, manually constructed) keyword-based patterns of 
the anti-spam filter of Microsoft Outlook 2000.9 These are 58 
patterns, looking for particular keywords in the body or header 
fields of the messages (e.g. “Body contains ‘,000’ AND Body 
contains ‘!!’ AND Body contains ‘$’”). The keyword-based 
filter was applied on an unencrypted version of the PU1 
corpus, achieving spam precision 95.15% and spam recall 
53.01%. (These results were obtained using a case-insensitive 
version of the patterns. The original case-sensitive patterns 
achieved spam precision 95.45% and spam recall 39.29%.) 
 
                                                 
8 Decryption experts may be able to recover chunks of the 
original text based on frequency and co-occurrence patterns. 
Given the uninteresting nature of the messages in PU1, 
however, it is difficult to imagine why one would want to 
waste time on this exercise.  
9 “Microsoft Outlook” is a trademark of Microsoft 
Corporation. Outlook’s on-line documentation points to a file 
that contains the patterns of its anti-spam filter.  
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Figure 1: Spam precision and recall of the Naive Bayesian 
filter for 5.0=t  ( 1=λ ) 
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Figure 2: Spam precision and recall of the Naive Bayesian 
filter for 9.0=t  ( 9=λ ) 
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Figure 3: Spam precision and recall of the Naive Bayesian 
filter for 999.0=t  ( 999=λ ) 
Figures 1 – 3 show a gradual increase of spam precision and 
decrease of spam recall as λ  increases. This is due to the fact 
that for higher λ  values the classifier needs to be more 
“certain” before blocking a message as spam, which increases 
its precision but reduces the number of spam messages it 
blocks. Overall, the Naive Bayesian filter achieves impressive 
spam recall and precision combinations at all three thresholds, 
verifying similar findings by Sahami et al. The Naive Bayesian 
filter also outperforms the keyword-based filter at most 
numbers of retained attributes (most of the points in figures 1 – 
3 are over 95.15% precision and 53.01% recall). The spread of 
the points in the figures, however, shows that the number of 
retained attributes has an important influence on spam recall 
and precision, and hence it cannot be chosen without careful 
experimentation. Without a single evaluation measure, that 
would be used instead of spam recall and precision, it is 
difficult to decide which number of attributes (or equivalently 
which recall-precision combination) leads to the best results, 
and whether or not the lemmatizer and stop-list have 
statistically significant effects. The single evaluation measure 
must also be sensitive to the fact that the SL→  and LS→  
errors are not assigned equal costs.10 We introduce appropriate 
cost-sensitive evaluation measures in the next section. 
4. Cost-sensitive evaluation 
In classification tasks, performance is often measured in terms 
of accuracy ( Acc ) or error rate ( AccErr −= 1 ). If LN  and 
SN  are the total numbers of legitimate and spam messages to 
be classified by the filter, respectively, and LLn → , SSn → , 
SLn → , LSn →  are as in section 2, then: 
SL
SSLL
NN
nnAcc
+
+
=
→→         
SL
LSSL
NN
nnErr
+
+
=
→→  
Accuracy and error rate assign equal weights to the two error 
types ( SL→  and LS→ ). When formulating the 
classification criterion (section 2), however, we assumed that 
SL→  is λ  times more costly than LS→ . To make 
accuracy and error rate sensitive to this cost difference, we 
treat each legitimate message as if it were λ  messages. That 
is, when a legitimate message is blocked, this counts as λ  
errors; and when it passes the filter, this counts as λ  
successes. This leads to the following definitions of weighted 
accuracy (WAcc ) and weighted error rate 
( WAccWErr −= 1 ): 
SL
SSLL
NN
nnWAcc
+⋅
+⋅
=
→→
λ
λ     
SL
LSSL
NN
nnWErr
+⋅
+⋅
=
→→
λ
λ  
The values of accuracy and error rate (or our weighted versions 
of them) are often misleadingly high. To get a clear picture of 
the performance of a classifier, it is common to compare its 
accuracy or error rate to those of a simplistic “baseline” 
approach. We take the case where no filter is present to be our 
baseline: legitimate messages are (correctly) never blocked, 
and spam messages (mistakenly) always pass the filter. The 
weighted accuracy and weighted error rate of the baseline are: 
                                                 
10 The F-measure, often used in information retrieval and 
extraction to combine recall and precision (e.g. [22]) cannot be 
used here, because its weighting factor cannot be easily related 
to our notion of cost. 
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We also introduce the total cost ratio ( TCR ), defined below, 
which allows the performance of an anti-spam filter to be 
compared easily to that of the baseline: 
LSSL
S
b
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N
WErr
WErrTCR
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Greater TCR  values indicate better performance. For 
1<TCR , the baseline (not using the filter) is better. If cost is 
proportional to wasted time, an intuitive meaning for TCR  is 
the following: it measures how much time is wasted to delete 
manually all spam messages when no filter is used ( SN ), 
compared to the time wasted to delete manually any spam 
messages that passed the filter ( LSn → ) plus the time needed to 
recover from mistakenly blocked legitimate messages 
( SLn →⋅λ ). 
Table 2 summarizes the results we obtained with the Naive 
Bayesian filter on PU1 for 999,9,1=λ , with the lemmatizer 
and stop-list enabled or disabled, and using the best numbers 
of attributes (those that lead to the highest TCR  scores in each 
case). It also shows the corresponding results of the keyword-
based filter and the baseline.11 Figures 4 – 6 show the TCR  
scores for the three λ  values at different numbers of attributes. 
In all the experiments with the Naive Bayesian (NB) filter, ten-
fold cross validation was used, and average WAcc  is reported. 
                                                 
11 The TCR scores with case sensitive keyword-patterns were 
1.60, 1.29, and 0.05, respectively. 
In ten-fold cross validation experiments, TCR  is computed as 
bWErr  divided by the average WErr .12 
For 1=λ , the Naive Bayesian filter achieves 1>TCR  at all 
numbers of attributes (figure 4). The keyword-based filter also 
scores 1>TCR , but the Naive Bayesian filter is better up to 
550 attributes. Increasing the number of attributes of the Naive 
Bayesian filter beyond a certain point degrades its 
performance, because attributes with low MI  do not 
discriminate well between spam and legitimate messages. 
Paired single-tailed t-tests on WAcc  confirm at 001.0<p  that 
configurations (a), (b), (c), and (d) of the Naive Bayesian filter 
(table 2) are all significantly better than the keyword-based 
filter and the baseline. Enabling the lemmatizer or the stop-list 
does not seem to have any significant effect. Indeed, paired 
single-tailed t-tests at 05.0<p  do not confirm the hypotheses 
of table 2 about (a), (b), (c), (d) themselves (e.g. that (b) is 
better than (c)); and at 1.0<p , the only one of these 
hypotheses that is confirmed is that (d) is better than (c).  
For 9=λ , again both filters achieve constantly 1>TCR , with 
the Naive Bayesian being always better (figure 5). The stop-list 
has hardly any effect, while the lemmatizer seems to lead to a 
noticeable improvement.  The improvement of the lemmatizer, 
however, is not significant from a statistical point of view: the 
t-tests confirm the hypothesis of table 2 that (g) is better than 
(e) and (f) (and also (h)) only at 1.0<p , not 05.0<p . No 
other hypothesis of table 2 about (e), (f), (g), (h) themselves 
(e.g. that (h) is better than (e)) is confirmed at 1.0<p . The t-
tests, however, confirm at 001.0<p  that all the configurations 
                                                 
12 It is important not to compute the overall TCR as the 
average of the TCRs of the individual folds (repetitions), as 
this effectively ignores folds with TCR << 1.  
Filter used 
(“NB” is Naive Bayesian) 
λ  no. of 
attr.  
spam 
recall (%) 
spam 
precision (%) 
weighted 
accuracy (%) 
TCR 
(a) NB bare 1 50 83.98 95.11 91.076 4.90 
(b) NB with stop-list 1 50 84.19 96.76 91.167 4.95 
(c) NB with lemmatizer 1 100 78.14 98.25 89.796 4.29 
(d) NB with lemmatizer and stop-list 1 100 79.60 97.96 90.341 4.53 
Keyword patterns (case insensitive) 1 − 53.01 95.15 78.253 2.01 
Baseline (no filter) 1 − 0 ∞ 56.233 1 
(e) NB bare 9 100 78.77 96.65 96.378 2.20 
(f) NB with stop-list 9 150 74.83 97.34 96.508 2.28 
(g) NB with lemmatizer 9 100 75.86 98.50 97.183 2.83 
(h) NB with lemmatizer and stop-list 9 100 75.86 97.91 96.886 2.56 
Keyword patterns (case insensitive) 9 − 53.01 95.15 94.324 1.40 
Baseline (no filter)  9 − 0 ∞ 92.040 1 
(i) NB bare 999 700 46.96 98.80 99.475 0.15 
(j) NB with stop-list 999 700 47.17 98.76 99.475 0.15 
(k) NB with lemmatizer 999 50 60.68 98.79 99.322 0.11 
(l) NB with lemmatizer and stop-list 999 600 49.45 98.31 99.313 0.11 
Keyword patterns (case insensitive) 999 − 53.01 95.15 97.862 0.04 
Baseline (no filter) 999 − 0 ∞ 99.922 1 
Table 2: Results on the PU1 corpus using the best number of attributes (1099 total messages, 43.8% spam, 10-fold
cross validation, number of attributes ranging from 50 to 700 by 50)
 (e), (f), (g), and (h) of the Naive Bayesian filter are better than 
the keyword-based filter and the baseline. 
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Figure 4: TCR  of the filters for 5.0=t  ( 1=λ ) 
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Figure 5: TCR  of the filters for 9.0=t  ( 9=λ ) 
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Figure 6: TCR  of the filters for 999.0=t  ( 999=λ ) 
For 999=λ , the t-tests again confirm at 001.0<p  that 
configurations (i), (j), (k), and (l) of the Naive Bayesian filter 
(table 2) are all significantly better than the keyword-based 
filter, though none of the other hypotheses of table 2 is 
confirmed at 1.0<p . Both filters, however, score constantly 
1<TCR  (figure 6; notice the different scale from figures 4 and 
5). This is due to the very high penalty on the SL→  errors, 
and the fact that none of the two filters manages to eliminate 
these errors completely. We conclude that for 999=λ , not 
using any of the two filters is actually better, despite their high 
spam precision and recall.  
A remaining question is how much training data the Naive 
Bayesian filter needs to be effective for 1=λ  and 9=λ . To 
answer this question, we conducted a second series of 
experiments with the Naive Bayesian filter, this time varying 
the size of the training corpus. The corpus was again divided 
into ten parts, and one part was reserved for testing at every 
run. From each one of the remaining nine parts, only x % was 
used for training, with x  ranging from 10 to 100 by 10. The 
experiments were performed with the best configurations of 
table 2, i.e. (b) and (g). Figure 7 shows the resulting TCR  
scores for 1=λ  and 9=λ . It also shows the TCR  score that 
the keyword-based filter achieved for 1=λ  and 9=λ  on the 
entire corpus. It can be seen that the Naive Bayesian (NB) 
filter achieves 1>TCR  and outperforms the keyword-based 
filter even with very small training corpora.  
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Figure 7: TCR  for variable size of training corpus 
5. Conclusions 
Our cost-sensitive evaluation suggests that neither the Naive 
Bayesian nor the keyword-based filter perform well enough to 
be used when 999=λ , a λ  value we employed to model the 
scenario where blocked messages are deleted without further 
processing. The performance of both filters, however, is 
satisfactory for 1=λ and 9=λ . We used the latter values to 
model the case where a mechanism is available to re-post 
blocked messages to private addresses.  
The Naive Bayesian filter outperforms by far the keyword-
based filter, even with very small training corpora. For 9=λ  
and 999=λ , its performance showed signs of improvement 
when a lemmatizer was added, but the improvements were not 
statistically significant. Adding a stop-list does not seem to 
have any noticeable effect, presumably because the MI -based 
attribute selection rarely picks words that are so common as 
those of the stop-list.  
 We interpret these results as implying that, with additional 
safety nets, automatically trainable anti-spam filters are 
practically viable and can have a significant effect. We plan to 
implement alternative anti-spam filters, based on other 
machine learning algorithms, and evaluate them on publicly 
available benchmark corpora. We expect anti-spam filtering to 
become an important member of an emerging family of junk-
filtering tools for the Internet, which will include – among 
others – tools to remove unwanted advertisements [13], and 
block hostile or pornographic material [8] [25].  
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